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A Dialogue on the Ethics of Science:  Henri Poincaré and Pope Francis 
By: Nicholas Danne 
 
Abstract:  
To teach the ethics of science to science majors, I follow several teachers in the literature who 
recommend “persona” writing, or the student construction of dialogues between ethical thinkers 
of interest.  To engage science majors in particular, and especially those new to academic 
philosophy, I recommend constructing persona dialogues from Henri Poincaré’s essay, “Ethics 
and Science” (1963/1913), and the non-theological third chapter of Pope Francis’s (2015) 
encyclical on the environment, Laudato si.  This pairing of interlocutors offers two advantages.  
The first is that science students are likely to recognize both names, since Poincaré appears in 
undergraduate mathematics and physics textbooks, and because Francis is an environmentalist 
celebrity.  Hence students (in my experience) show more interest in these figures than in other 
philosophers.  The second advantage is that the third chapter of Laudato si reads like an implicit 
rebuttal of Poincaré’s essay in many respects, and so contriving a dialogue between those authors 
both facilitates classroom discussion, and deserves attention from professional ethicists in its 
own right.  In this paper, I present my own contrived dialogue between Francis and Poincaré, not 
for assigning to students as a reading, but as a template for an effective assignment product, and 
as a crib sheet for educators to preview the richly antiparallel themes between the two works.   
 
Main Text: 
I. NAME-DROPPING FOR NON-MAJORS 
Often a science student’s introduction to philosophy begins by their enrolling in an ethics class 
required for graduation.  I have taught that class several times, and as a degreed engineer myself, 
I feel at home among the intensely analytical students who have zero tolerance for “fluff,” a key 
indicator of “fluff” being a subject matter’s lack of governing equations,1 or its imperviousness 
to experimentation and measurement.  To break the ice, then, I sometimes attempt to engage my 
students under the guise of not-doing-philosophy.  One form of this guise, profitably exploited in 
advertising, is name-dropping.  I sometimes notice eye-contact from the most aloof of students 
when I mention names that they know, and which their own peers and major professors respect.  
 
1 When I was an engineering undergraduate, for example, I disliked equation-free introductory 
biology.  I felt like I had to take the professor’s and textbook’s word for everything. 
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Mechanical and aerospace engineering students, in particular, devote long hours to studying 
Mach-speed aerodynamics and the formation of Mach cones, perhaps without realizing that Ernst 
Mach was an influential philosopher of science, who studied Isaac Newton’s laws not only to 
apply useful equations, but to interpret the equations in a deeper and more responsible sense than 
engineering textbooks are likely to explicate.  The same goes for Henri Poincaré, a name gracing 
the mathematics and physics textbooks of all engineering students.  Who would have thought 
that Poincaré would have dabbled in ethics?  But dabble he did, writing an accessible and 
opinionated polemic, “Ethics and Science,” published posthumously in 1913 (Poincaré 1963).  I 
employ such revelations as one vehicle for convincing science students to respect philosophy, at 
least a little bit.  
 My purpose in this essay, however, is to engage ethics-of-science educators rather than 
students.  For there is another prominent name that science students recognize, Time magazine’s 
2013 “Person of the Year” and celebrated environmentalist, Pope Francis.  What I seek to 
highlight in this essay is the remarkable covert dialectic between Poincaré’s “Ethics and 
Science” (hereafter ES) and Pope Francis’s (2015) encyclical on the environment, Laudato si 
(hereafter LS).  I say “covert” rhetorically, having no proof that Francis read Poincaré, or is 
responding a century later to his polemic; but in many ways the non-theological third chapter of 
LS reads like a detailed rebuttal of ES, and I have found this dialectic profitable to examine with 
science students.   
 Profitable how?  Specifically, as a creative format and change of pace; a departure not 
only from the analysis paper and ethics speech, but from the rigorous analytical methods needed 
to complete those assignments well.  I notice, in other words, that some first-time philosophy 
students harbor a traditional or overtly religious notion of morality, and part of my task in 
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cultivating a pluralistic student mindset for recognizing areligious normative paradigms like 
deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue in the workplace is shepherding students away from their 
comfortable traditions.  Hence, I assign the Francis-Poincaré dialogue after mid-term, to allow 
students to “spring back” to what might be their ethical comfort zone, to let them relate without 
paradigmatic rules to two vibrant texts that seem to lock horns across a century of scientific 
achievement.  I intend the student to absorb the two messages at face value, and then to intuit 
through contrived dialogue the message that most resonates with the student, or to introduce a 
moral claim that one of the interlocutors might plausibly advance against the other.   
 The learning objectives for this assignment are twofold.  First, it affirms a place for moral 
intuition and exploration alongside the normative-paradigmatic reasoning drilled in the first half 
of the term; for by mid-term, some students may recognize limitations or shortcomings inherent 
to a given paradigm,2 and desire to formulate in non-theoretic language what is immoral within a 
given scenario.  Secondly, the exercise tacitly allows students to discover for themselves how 
much they like (or dislike) resorting to traditional ethical intuitions after being trained in classical 
normative paradigms.  Recognizing where there is overlap between the old and new systems, and 
where there is clearly no overlap, forms an important dimension of the critical ethical thinker, in 
my view.  Specifically, recognizing this overlap can lead to a self-check against unwarranted 
bias, although I think that systematic bias is too large a topic to shoehorn into the dialogue 
assignment itself, and should be taught in an auxiliary lesson. 
 Thus, to clarify, the mock dialogue that I offer in section III is not one that I would assign 
any students to read.  It is rather a template for the finished product of an assignment that is fun 
to grade and intuition-friendly to compose.  My mock dialogue is noticeably inelegant, stilted, 
 
2 An excellent catalog of these limitations, accessible to students, appears in the introduction of Daly 
(2016). 
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and somewhat facetious for consisting mostly of direct quotes; but for reasons that I explain in 
section IV, this format is by design.  Before presenting my dialogue, I provide in section II some 
background on the texts by Francis and Poincaré, to anticipate the ethical themes likely to 
emerge from them. 
 
II. LAUDATO SI AND THE ETHICS OF SCIENCE 
Understanding my mock dialogue requires prior contextualization.  The philosophy instructor 
should be aware, for example, that Laudato si has been widely acclaimed as an ecumenical and 
even humanist call to care for the environment, a call issued not merely to maximize utilitarian 
outcomes, or to apply theology, or to signal existential despair in high places.  The encyclical 
instead renders care for the environment a matter of ethical uprightness, emphasizing the 
personal emptiness (LS, para. 113)3 to be found in people of all creeds and walks of life who 
relegate the natural environment to an object of consumerist control.  This emptiness, this 
character fault, allegedly afflicts everyone, from wealthy financiers, to the exploited poor, to 
even some environmentalists who rely too confidently on technological solutions to pollution, 
resource scarcity, and climate change (LS, Chapter 3, §§I-II).  One of the main ethical takeaways 
of LS finds independent expression by other authors (e.g., Vallor 2015), that technology is not a 
morally neutral device; it instead transfers immense power into the hands of a few (LS, para. 
104-112), whom according to Francis have positioned society on a trajectory of emptiness (LS, 
para. 109) and perdition.     
 Some philosophers share my view that one of the main objectives of Laudato si is the 
moral betterment of the agent who consumes resources (Weidel 2019; McGuigan 2019, 402; 
 
3 The abbreviation “para.” indicates paragraph number, not to be confused with section number (“§”) 
or chapter, in LS. 
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Iheka 2017, 253-254; Sedmak 2016, §1).  Others praise the encyclical as a timely advance in 
postsecular environmentalism (Handley 2016; Szerszynski 2016), or relatedly, point out the 
inclusive array of non-Vatican sources in the document’s footnotes (Sedmak 2017, 942-943).  
Alternative analyses conclude that LS renders the environment “ontologically significant” for 
ethical appraisal (Weidel 2019, 31), and helps the scientist or engineer promote the “common 
good” over the “greater good” (Punzi 2018), while other authors suggest interpretations of LS in 
terms of “media theory” (Dettloff 2017, 932) and St. Francis of Assisi’s Canticle of the Sun 
(Szerszynski 2016).  Some critics, on the other hand, dismiss the encyclical as anti-modernist 
(Reno 2015). 
 As I intimated in section I, my objective is neither to promote nor undermine particular 
claims from LS, but only to briefly square it in all its richness with ES, which I now also 
contextualize.  Poincaré’s renown as a physicist and mathematician has lasted from his day to 
ours, and his influence on the philosophy of science also remains significant.4  His foray into 
ethics in ES, on the other hand, appears largely independent of his better-known work,5 since in 
ES he defends the value-free purity of science, and the logical distinctness of ethics and science 
as disciplines (Barrotta 2018).  Poincaré’s (1963) curious addition to these theses is an in-
principle identity between the moral fruits of scientific and ethical practice.  While he refuses in 
Humean fashion to derive “ought” claims from “is” claims,6 Poincaré (1963) argues that the 
 
4 Particularly with respect to his conventionalism (Ivanova 2015; Ben-Menahem 2006) and structural 
realism (McArthur 2006; Chakravartty 1998; Zahar 1996; Worrall 1989). 
5 Some might disagree with me, and object that Poincaré’s Kantian conventionalism about science 
grounds or establishes a conventionalism about ethics.  As scientists pursue the beautiful order that “‘pure 
intelligence can grasp’” (Ivanova 2015: 85, n. 13; cf. Poincaré 1963: 109), in other words, so ethically-
minded agents in Poincaré’s (1963) account pursue an identically beautiful and reasonable order of action 
and behavior.  I bypass in this paper the possible Kantian motivations for ES.   
6 Barrotta (2018) supports my reading of Poincaré (1963) as Humean. 
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scientific practice trafficking entirely in “is” claims serves to fulfill moral norms; a conclusion 
for which some have criticized ES as inconsistent (Kelsen 1991). 
 Thus, while remaining neutral on the ethical soundness of ES, I find it sufficiently 
provocative to engage philosophical novices without flattening them.  Important to this end is 
that I broach the value-laden-ness of science to my students, prior to the dialogue assignment.  
Whether or not my class debates the value-neutrality of science, my standard assignments 
(analysis papers, ethics speeches) presuppose that parties to historical engineering disasters held 
moral and non-moral values, and I require students to identify those values and supply evidence 
that they were held.  Debating or defending Poincaré at the ground level of the value-neutrality 
question could succeed in a student dialogue, but I do not see that exchange as essential to the 
assignment, and it does not occur in my example of section III.7 
 This dialectical point suggests another important one, however, which could arise so 
often as to trivialize some dialogues.  The insight is that perhaps technological development and 
application are perspicuously more value-laden (involved as they are with entertainment and 
leisure) than are the pure sciences of chemistry and physics, in the last century.  Because Francis 
writes predominantly on the ethics of technology (but also mentions “science” to a fair extent),8 
and because Poincaré scarcely if at all mentions technology, the trivial conclusion looms that 
both parties are right:  the ethical values that producers and consumers of technology have 
overlooked (according to Francis) simply do not emerge for the pure scientist to overlook 
(vindicating Poincaré).9  In response, I take the defeasible stance that even small improvements 
 
7 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on the importance and pedagogical difficulty of 
undermining the value-neutrality of science generally. 
8 Francis’s references to science in LS include paragraphs 62 (quoted in section III), 63, 102-103, 106 
(quoted in section III), 107, 110, 113 (quoted in section III), 114 (quoted in section III), 131-133, 135-
136, 143, 183, 186, 188, and 199-201. 
9 I thank an anonymous reviewer for a similar version of this objection. 
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in much of the technology that Francis mentions (airplanes, skyscrapers, medicine) require 
relatively substantial and extensive progress in the pure sciences, such that to deny outright the 
cross-implications of Francis and Poincaré’s messages is simply naive.10  Of course, to insert 
Poincaré and Francis into dialogue at all, one cannot idly compare scientist ethics (Poincaré) 
with producer and consumer ethics (Francis).  But because neither author writes exclusively of 
those respective groups, my blurring of science-technology and scientist-producer-consumer 
implications appears justified for a first-order exchange.11  I also acknowledge that there exist 
insightful and detailed philosophical accounts of how the ethics of science and technology differ 
(Franssen, Lokhorst, and van de Poel 2018, §2.2), and of how scientific and moral “errors” might 
be inextricably linked (Condorcet 1976);12 while analyzing Francis and/or Poincaré with a view 
to these theses could be rewarding, I am more interested in letting students’ intuitions drive their 
engagement with the celebrity names they recognize, for reasons that I postpone yet again to 
section IV.   
 In the meantime, I recommend some ground rules about which arguments not to level 
against Poincaré.  For Poincaré can sound naive and insensitive in his polemic, writing as he 
does from an early twentieth century perspective.  When he quips, for example, that “Morality 
has nothing to fear from a science which is motivated by a true experimental spirit” (Poincaré 
1963, 110), I expect my students to do more than criticize from a position of hindsight.  Aware 
as we are of the horrors of human experimentation in World War II concentration camps, or in 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (Nix 2019), I expect my students to develop the more difficult and 
 
10 In the automotive industry, for example, full-time ceramic scientists spend years laboring for a few 
percentage points of increase in ceramic dielectric strength, and implementing this new material in turn 
requires double-digit iterations of spark plug prototypes for trial-and-error experimentation on an engine. 
11 I propose in section IV some discussion questions about the appropriateness of this blurring. 
12 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this Condorcet reference. 
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mature claims that Poincaré’s “experimental spirit” thesis always or usually yields net negative 
outcomes, or that it inherently possesses a blind spot about rights or personal character, etc.13  
One genuine debate that I try to elucidate in my dialogue is that between Francis’s warnings 
about technology’s deleterious effects on our character, and Poincaré’s counter-claim that 
scientific practice requires and inculcates good character.  Of course, readers might not like the 
winner that I pick, or the arguments that I counterpose, but reconciling the two readings or 
providing “the right message for students to grasp” is not my purpose; the relevance of celebrity 
opinion for contemporary problems is my purpose, and I expect the disagreements that celebrity 
opinion is bound to engender.14  Now please enjoy, as far as possible, how I have combined the 
two texts. 
 
III. THE DIALOGUE 
A jail cell somewhere in Europe 
P:  What brings you in?15 
 
F:  I was picketing the expansion of an air-conditioner factory.  Then a policeman nabbed me for 
giving a homeless man a sandwich. 
 
P:  I heard about that factory.  It’s going to have a terrific R&D wing.   
 
13 A different rule that instructors might enforce is a prohibition on theological skirmish dialogues.  
Poincaré writes brashly against religion in ES, and Francis in LS provides plenty of material for replies.  I 
dabble lightly with the theological in my dialogue, recognizing that this angle can steer a philosophy 
course off track. 
14 By “celebrity opinion,” I do not mean “untutored ethical opinion.”  Francis has formal training in 
ethics, and for all I know, Poincaré might have also. 
15 P = Poincaré, with parenthetical citations indicating page numbers of Poincaré (1963); F = Francis, 
with parenthetical citations indicating paragraph numbers of Laudato si. 
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F:  Keen choice of words.  In one sense, we are “right to rejoice” in technological advances, 
because they are human creativities (para. 102), but our “technological development has not been 
accompanied by a development in human responsibility, values and conscience” (para. 105).  
Humankind’s interpersonal and environmental violence is interlinked, and not a little terroristic.   
 
P:  What are you talking about?  Man’s problems are man’s, and science if anything makes him 
better.16  Hopefully you do not imply something deeper but quite illogical, that the “indicative” 
enterprise of science has any bearing on the “imperative” claims of ethics (104).  The two 
domains are very different.  “There cannot be . . . [an] immoral science” (104). 
 
F:  No, I am neither calling science immoral, nor disparaging indicative disciplines.  Technology 
has obviously “remedied countless evils” (para. 102), and I happen to find an “aircraft or a 
skyscraper” to be things of “beauty . . .” (para. 103).  The Church that I serve, moreover, “does 
not presume to settle scientific questions or to replace politics” (para. 188).  But surely your 
sweeping claim that science makes us better needs qualification! 
 
P:  I don’t see how your objection would go, for in many ways, science can “exercise an indirect 
influence”—and a good one—on morality (104).  “Science keeps us in constant relation to 
 
16 An anonymous reviewer objects that this reading of Poincaré is too strong, and unjustified by the 
remainder of the present main-text paragraph.  As the full text of Poincaré (1963) conveys, however, and 
as I intend the remainder of section III to convey, Poincaré’s polemic is an overt and sustained defense of 
the claim that ‘science, if anything, makes us better’ (quoting my paraphrase).  The brazenness of 
Poincaré’s thesis motivates my selecting it for undergraduates. 
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something which is greater than ourselves,” for instance (105).  “[I]t leads us to guess at 
something greater,” and so proves to be an intrinsically selfless discipline (105).   
 
F:  Maybe in the course of a single experiment or day’s work you are right, but for the longer 
term I have my doubts.  “The specialization which belongs to technology,” for example, “makes 
it difficult to see the larger picture” about ethical living (para. 110).  This larger picture includes 
“the environment and the poor” (para. 110), neither of which appear to be the overt concern of 
the R&D department you praised.  So it is not true that scientists and technologists, in their 
professional practice, focus always on something greater than themselves.  Technocrats instead 
build up their fields of specialty, and this “fragmentation of knowledge” makes “the broader 
horizon . . . irrelevant” (para. 110), ethically and practically.   
 
P:  You’ll have to say more than that to discredit my point.  Science is a long-term, “collective 
task . . .” (106).  It breeds “solidarity,” and even “makes [scientists] capable of all kinds of 
heroism and of devotion” (106).  Are those not ethically positive traits?  Indeed, scientists like 
myself “feel that we are working in behalf of humanity, and humanity becomes dearer to us as a 
result” (106). 
 
F:  Two replies.  First, I hope that we do not talk at cross-purposes.  We have been using 
“science” and “technology” interchangeably, and I hope that such use is fair.  Even so, I would 
object that you seem to argue in a scientific vacuum, since you overlook the “economic and 
political life” in which “[t]he technocratic paradigm . . . tends to dominate . . .” (para. 109).  
Surely you cannot deny that today’s “economy accepts every advance in technology with a view 
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to profit . . .” (para. 109).  My point is that this “market cannot guarantee . . . social inclusion” 
(para. 109). 
 
P:  Fine, man is man and succumbs easily to money, if that’s your point.  I maintain that science 
will see us out of the morass, or at least that “ethics and science, as they both progress, will 
surely adapt themselves to each other” (113).  For how is the scientist to leave the ‘vacuum’ you 
mention, if he diverts his eyes from truth?  “It is the love of truth even more than passion which 
inspires [the scientist]” (105), and my proof of this claim I present rhetorically.  Ask yourself, if 
you will: “Is there anything which is more important [in science] than to combat lies . . . ?” 
(105).  The best scientists inculcate within themselves a “concern for absolute sincerity” (105), 
they reject “hasty generalizations” and “fashionable” ideas (110), and hence scientists better than 
anyone else manage to forestall their own self-deception (105).  If you’ll pardon me for saying 
so, I feel like I am reinventing the wheel of your own, theistic, moral code, from scratch. 
 
F:  Truth does not “automatically flow from technological . . . power as such” (para. 105). 
 
P:  Fair enough.  But the inclusivity—aye, the catholicity—of your ethical perspective strikes me 
as nearly identical to the attitude of the scientific truth-seeker.  Consider that science “is tending 
more and more to show us the mutual dependence of the different parts of the universe; to unveil 
its harmony to us. . . . [S]cience tends towards unity and leads us towards unity.  Just as it 
coordinates the particular laws and links them to a more general law, will it not also reduce to 
unity the intimate aspirations of our hearts which are seemingly so divergent, so capricious, and 
so alien to one another?” (108-109). 
 12
 
F:  Such a result and tendency might be wonderful, and focusing on the “common good” does 
check our “greed . . .” (para. 204).  The problem is that the “‘motive’” of technology is 
“‘power’,” to quote Romano Guardini (para. 108).  He observes that via technology, “‘man 
seizes hold of both nature and human nature’,” a grip that I think our modern dependence on 
technology only strengthens (para. 108).  Add to this state of affairs the insight that the 
“scientific method . . . itself is already a technique of possession, mastery and transformation” 
(para. 106), and one can realize that within the technocratic paradigm, “[o]ur capacity for making 
decisions, a more genuine freedom and the space for each one’s creativity are diminished” (para. 
108).  That outcome contradicts your thesis.  What you call the ‘aspirations of our hearts’ are 
often snuffed out, not integrated, by technology.   
 
P:  Right, you’re back to man’s corrupt motives, attachments, and temptations.  Perhaps that is 
the very problem with your theology of God intervening on Earth: that it has made you gaze so 
long at the earth.  On the contrary, I think that “the God of the scientist [is] the greater the farther 
he withdraws from us” (105-106); when our higher truth is Indicative Truth, we have to keep 
looking upward and outward until we obtain it.  “In our shortcomings [as human scientists], the 
loftiness of our ideal will sustain us” (105). 
 
F:  For the record, my Church also looks outward, “to the end of time . . .” (para. 100).  “[T]here 
is,” moreover, “an infinite distance between God and the things of this world,” in the sense that 
we certainly ought not worship nature (para. 88).  But from our shared position of hindsight,17 
 
17 In this anachronistic, time-warping jail cell. 
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the scientific ideal you allege seems not to have delivered the goods you envision.  “[P]eople no 
longer seem to believe in a happy future; they no longer have blind trust in a better tomorrow 
based on the present state of the world and our technical abilities. There is a growing awareness 
that scientific and technological progress cannot be equated with the progress of humanity and 
history, a growing sense that the way to a better future lies elsewhere” (para. 113).   
 
P:  But are the people who harbor these opinions scientists?  I would not expect non-scientists to 
grasp the profundity of what we’re discussing:  a quasi-moral system incidentally buoyed by 
scientific practice, which could someday replace people’s ethics without fanfare, as a middle-
schooler stops believing in charm bracelets (cf. 113). 
 
F:  The point is that regardless of someone’s accumulated scientific knowledge, “[s]cience and 
technology are not neutral” to the knower’s ethical wellness (para. 114).  You seem to concur 
when you claim that scientific practice inculcates virtue and forbids mendacity.  The problem is 
that your divinized indicative ideal is utterly meaningless, and this meaninglessness has ethical 
consequences.  Consider, for example, a recurring by-product of technological development: “the 
accumulation of constant novelties . . .” (para. 113).  This accumulation “exalts a superficiality 
which pulls us in one direction” (para. 113) toward exploitation and waste—the same direction 
as your ideal, Henri?   
  
My sympathizers who are engineers might argue thusly:  Are not some devices invented, in part, 
to achieve the ideal of ‘efficiency’ for its own sake?  Do not some firms undertake to reduce the 
dimensions of a smartphone battery by one millimeter, just to become Best-in-Class in that 
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dimension?18  And yet this achievement will be obsoleted in months, when “certain powerful 
groups” (para. 107) demand another size reduction, another marketing pitch.  Granted, some 
improvements in efficiency help the environment, but I deny that the end always justifies the 
means.  Within the technocratic paradigm, “[i]t becomes difficult to pause and recover depth in 
life”; we find that despite “a constant flood” of achievements, “the spirit of globalized 
technology” instills the kind of “tedious monotony” (para. 113) that technology was supposed to 
alleviate.  We risk becoming a people that “would simply legitimate the present situation and 
need new forms of escapism to help us endure the emptiness” (para. 113).  The poor, the 
environment, and our relationships suffer as a result. 
 
P:  I see.  We may have reached an impasse, however, for I still suspect that a community of the 
science-educated and science-disciplined would treat each other as well as you like.  Education is 
key.  “Man cannot renounce knowledge without belittling himself; and that is why the interests 
of science are sacred” (107). 
 
F:  But “the fragmentation of knowledge and the isolation of bits of information can actually 
become a form of ignorance” (para. 138); we’ve been over this point.  “Nonetheless, science and 
religion, with their distinctive approaches to understanding reality, can enter into an intense 
dialogue fruitful for both” (para. 62).  Have we not accomplished that today? 
 
Henri shuffles to the cell window, where he gazes left and right 
 
18 I conjecture this scenario from my industrial experience, where I witnessed a lot of expensive 
haggling over unnoticeably small cosmetic changes to under-hood components.  If cell phone designers 
never engage in such practices, then just change the example. 
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P:  I’m still not sure that world religions and my quasi-ethics are all that different; we scientists 
even venerate our ancestors (106). 
 
F:  And we risk drowning the voices of such “sages” in the din of “information overload” (para. 
47).  Speaking of which, I have not yet asked you your crime.  You were polite to ask me mine. 
 
P:  A fourth speeding ticket, in as many weeks, on my way to work.  Sometimes my passion for 




Poincaré and Francis paid their bails and went their separate ways, just as some science and 
engineering students pay tuition for what might be their first and last philosophy class.  Are we 
philosophy teachers prepared to engage them?  As one form of engagement, I suggest letting 
celebrities speak for themselves once in a while, and I am by no means the first teacher to do so.  
Philosopher of science James Ladyman (2002) uses contrived dialogues to teach, and Penny 
Weiss (2002) assigns what she calls the “Viewpoint Project,” a student’s analysis of an anecdote 
from the student’s life experience, composed in the first-personal guise of an author being 
studied.  How would that author theoretically assess that experience?  I did something similar in 
Francis’s discussion of the smartphone battery, in section III. 
 In the same vein, Rina Zazkis and Boris Koichu (2015) compose a fictional dialogue to 
dissect a heady mathematical proof, and John Atherton (1998) speaks for me and undoubtedly 
others when he reports that fictional dialogue assignments generate “[h]eightened attention to 
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lectures, identification of central issues in a given subject, engaged imagination, and energized 
writing . . .” (7).  He also points out that “persona” writing can break through one of the negative 
effects of studying celebrity opinions, which is students’ feeling “overwhelmed by the writer’s 
reputation” (7).  Arguing from a persona brings big names down to earth, Atherton explains, and 
allows students to see an author’s dialectical flaws or theoretical weak points (8); the method 
also holds “volatile passions . . . in abeyance,” and prevents “exposing the student’s own ego to 
the rude shock of criticism” (10).  This buffer seems especially important for teaching the ethics 
of science, where ideas rather than feelings or celebrity tropes need to be debated, perhaps for the 
first time in a student’s career. 
 But how do my students perform on the assignment?  I do not claim to have found a 
pedagogical panacea.  Students who struggle with analysis papers will not typically write 
marvelous screenplays.  Even top performers tend to write dialogues that resemble jejune Twitter 
battles, each speaker scoring rhetorical points somewhat unrelated to their interlocutor’s previous 
remark.  As can happen in steadily-prompted class discussions, however, subtle insights do 
emerge.  One student found Poincaré’s (1963, 110) admonition against “hasty generalizations” 
hypocritical, since arguing that all of organized religion can be replaced by the virtues of the 
practicing scientist itself appears hasty.  Another student embraced Poincaré’s denial that any 
given piece of knowledge is inherently harmful, and found this point to ground the difference 
between the ethics of science and the ethics of technology.  (One might respond with Rima 
Basu’s (2019) contention that even evidence-supported belief can wrong others in the context of 
racism; or might ask if it neutrally affects one’s temperance to know—with the aid of 
binoculars—how one’s attractive neighbor looks while sunbathing.)  Then again, many students 
take Francis to deliver the more relevant ethical message overall.  While both Francis and 
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Poincaré acknowledge the human prejudices that precipitate moral wrongdoing, one student 
opined that those prejudices should not be left to science to fix, and that toppling religion can be 
one of the harmful albeit “fashionable” kinds of ideas that Poincaré (1963, 110) condemns.  In 
live discussion, students also engaged broadly on the topic of “self-deception,” which both 
Francis and Poincaré warn against.  While students may at first attribute (too) many errors in a 
given engineering disaster as “self-deception,” pressing them to distinguish this fault from 
inculpable ignorance and other kinds of culpable ignorance can improve the ethical distinctions 
tendered in future assignments. 
 In closing, I recommend the Poincaré-Francis dialogue assignment, not merely to 
convince students that great minds can be ethically naive, but to contrast the priorities of science-
minded celebrities over a century of unparalleled technological growth.  I find intriguing the 
thesis that ethics-of-science views, generally construed, may be a function of current 
technological development; and I find this possibility important for the next generation to 
consider, lest the views that they develop now go unexamined and appear naive in the future.  To 
note, I do not recommend assigning student dialogues as lengthy as mine.  A minimum twelve-
line exchange, followed by a summary paragraph in plain language, gives the students room for 
creativity and their interlocutors room for nuanced replies.  Requiring a graded first-draft, to 
render the finished product more cohesive than a social media rant, may be wise.  Otherwise, 
students who have wrestled with the dialogue can typically offer first-pass answers to the 
following questions:  
 Was Poincaré right about ethics in his day, given the state of technology at the time?   
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 Will Poincaré be proven right in our day?  Is he already right?  Is there a specific 
invention in the last 150 years that made him right, or that made him wrong?19 
 How would you respond to the claim that Pope Francis argues too pessimistically 
against ethical outlooks like Poincaré’s? 
 Is there a way to fix Poincaré’s thesis to ensure that the diligent pursuit of science alone 
can make us ethically good?  Has Pope Francis, wittingly or not, identified that fix in 
Laudato si? 
 Is there an important difference between the ethics of science and the ethics of 
technology?   
 Do you think that Francis and Poincaré have absolutely nothing to say to each other?  
How do you defend that claim, considering how much pure science is needed for some 
technological developments?  
 
If the semester ends, and the science student has both learned and applied the ethical views of 
celebrities she recognizes, then the philosophy teacher has probably made the semester jail visit 
worthwhile.     
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